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Abstract: 
 
Election silence periods feature in several European democracies. However this 
paper argues that they have become democratic vulnerabilities in a context with 
increased internet based electoral meddling such as during #MacronLeaks. Using 
both discourse and social network analysis this study shows that the vacuum created 
by the inability of politicians and established media outlets to comment on the leaks 
empowered unregulated and unreliable sources which sought to drag the direction of 
the election away from the centre and towards the far right. Our findings have broad 
implications for understanding how social media activity is structured under the 
conditions of information leaks. The findings of this study may be relevant to other 
political events which involve the release of sensitive information via social media.  
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1. Introducing the French Presidential Campaign, #MacronLeaks and the 
Vulnerability of Election Blackouts 
 
On the eve of the 2017 French presidential election a massive cache of emails from 
the En Marche!, a centralist, liberal and social liberal party, candidate Emmanuel 
Macron, were leaked onto the internet. This coincided with the start of an enforced 
media blackout (or election silence) which covers 44 hours and prohibits both media 
coverage of the elections and campaigning by candidates (Conseil Constitutionelle 
2017). This paper argues that the example of #MacronLeaks acts as a “warning 
shot” to the inbuilt vulnerabilities of election blackout periods enshrined in democratic 
law. While for decades these periods have remained unchallenged elements of the 
democratic process, the spectre of outside electoral meddling transforms these 
periods into vulnerabilities where real or fake dumps of information can be made 
online concerning candidates without the possibility for redress by the candidates nor 
regulated and reliable national media outlets. 
 
This discretionary period is enshrined in the French electoral code (Conseil 
Constitutionelle 2017), with similar campaign blackout periods of varying lengths 
enforced in a number of established European democracies, including Ireland, Italy, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. Political scientists have paid little 
attention to these blackout periods because they have come under very limited 
challenges. This has has even been reflected in reduced political social media 
activity in black-out periods in the run up to polls, such as the 2011 Spanish elections 
where even the unregulated sphere of Twitter (Aragón et al 2013). As such, owing to 
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the reluctance of established media outlets or candidates themselves to fall foul of 
election blackout laws, and the “self-regulation” of the social media sphere, election 
silences have remained unchallenged. 
 
The election silence of the French presidential campaign presents the first case that 
has exposed the vulnerability of election silence periods and demonstrates that the 
changing media landscape has made them into vulnerabilities of democracy rather 
than strengths. This is render all the more important in a context where online forms 
of election manipulation have come to the fore as one of the key challenges to 
established democracies across the world (Laurinavičius 2018). This dovetails with 
observations about the leak of Macron’s emails as ‘clearly aimed at disrupting the 
electoral process’ (Tual and Leloup 2017) where the leak was timed with only hours 
to go before the French press were stopped by electoral laws from reporting on the 
election campaign. This gave established media outlets in France just enough time 
to cover that there had been an information breach, but did not provide enough time 
to give any substantive guidance on what this leak contained, let alone what the 
implications for what any politically damaging information would be. This meant that 
social media platforms such as Twitter became important places where coverage of 
the leak took place. This series of events has significant implications for the current 
French political landscape because it renders the laws governing electoral press 
blackouts as dangerously out of date because new media and un-regulated actors 
such as wikileaks are not subject to this law.  
 
This paper seeks to intervene in the understudied context of election blackouts to 
use #MacronLeaks as a means to understand the threats that such periods now 
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pose to democracy and to make the policy recommendation that governments need 
to re-examine how they engage with attempts at online election meddling during 
blackout periods. To do this, this paper uses digital methods to pursue three key 
research aims. Firstly the paper seeks to uncover the influential actor types using 
InDegree, Out Degree, and Betweenness Centrality during the initial time period 
when events surrounding Macron Leaks were at their height. This enables us to 
ascertain which actors are influential in the online discussion and understand the 
implications this has for election meddling during blackout periods. This directly 
identifies the way in which information spreads and what kinds of networks are 
created on social media during this period of attempted election meddling. Secondly, 
the paper conducts a discourse analysis of tweets to understand the content of 
influential tweets. This develops a better understanding of the types of discussions 
taking place on Twitter during #MacronLeaks. This enables the understanding of the 
way in which this election meddling was discussed by actors on Twitter and thus to 
see which narratives emerge as the most influential. Finally, as a macro aim of this 
paper, it seeks to use these insights to critically consider the implications of 
unregulated news media outlets and the role that they can have during elections and 
in particular the implications for the ongoing viability of election blackout periods in 
European democracies.   
 
2. Conceptualising Social Media, Fake News and European 
Elections 
 
An important empirical and conceptual starting point of this paper is the current 
position of election silence, or “blackout” periods, being as they are understudied and 
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unproblematised in current politics scholarship. This is because there have been little 
means by which European media organisations or political parties have been willing 
to breach such periods and face the political and legal consequences. In France the 
legal consequences of breaking such a ban are potentially very serious. Article L.52-
1 of the French electoral code prohibits all discussion of the candidates of the 
second round for 44 hours prior to the close of voting, with article L.90-1 legislating a 
maximum find for transgressions of €75,000 (Conseil Constitutionnel 2017). This 
does not include the inevitable damage to public image of any politician or media 
outlet in France which would result in transgressing this ban. However, the law does 
not simply make provisions for official media outlets and politicians to be silent during 
this 44 hour period. Interestingly in the French case this total silence also applies to 
voters – so in theory a private individual posting on their private social media account 
could be prosecuted (Satter 2017). Thus France sits in a context which directly 
contradicts one of the few available studies on election silence conducted in Spain 
(Aragón et al 2013). This is because iIn the Spanish context, it was recorded that the 
election blackout period applied in a self-regulating way to social media as voters 
themselves tweet less about the election in the blackout period in Spain where “even 
in the unregulated space of Twitter, the so called reflection day was followed.” In 
2011 (Aragón et al 2013). 
 
Going beyond the specifics of France, the findings of this study may be relevant to 
other political events which involve the release of information via social media. This 
is because in the context of the decision by the UK to cede from the European 
Union, and the election of Donald Trump in the USA both relied heavily on the 
spread of false facts and information specifically designed to influence voters and 
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change the outcome of the democratic process (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; 
Nussbaum, 2017). Both of these contexts are, however, different from France as the 
role of social media in these contexts relied on the content and activity generated 
primarily by domestic political audiences as a means to create support for anti-status 
quo political movements. Within this it has been argued that social media ‘memed’ 
into existence Donald Trump (Nussbaum, 2017) through the ability of alt-right 
activists to create and distribute their own political memes. While #MacronLeaks did 
involve some meme generation, the primary cause of the episode is something very 
different – the direct attempt at the manipulating the electoral process through the 
vulnerability created by the electoral silence period. 
 
Specifically important here is the central role in social media platforms such as 
Twitter and Facebook in facilitating and the online sphere in shaping political events 
in France at the time of the election. while 2017 was not the first French election in 
the internet era by a long way –it was the first year in which significant concerns 
were raised about the ability of social media being used to manipulate the electoral 
outcome. In tandem with increased terrorist activity online, resulted in France’s 
internet freedom score declining during 2018 as the French government sought to 
work with social media companies to take down content (Freedom House 2017). 
This demonstrates how important social media and web based platforms were during 
this period in France . Whereas journalistic rigour and ethics would have required 
narratives to be substantiated, social media allowed groups to create unverifiable 
narratives that could be spread to tens-of thousands, and in some cases hundreds-of 
thousands of individuals with little to no checks and balances (See inter alia 
Gerbaudo, 2012; Bennett, 2012; Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer, 2013). This was 
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exactly the kind of mechanism that those behind the #MacronLeaks data breach 
hoped to harness to taint a candidate whose weakness was the contradiction of him 
running as an ‘independent’, outside of the political establishment, while 
paradoxically having worked as an investment banker and served in the previous 
socialist government. The leaks, creating uncertainty about his previous, and 
unknown, record on corruption and personal wealth, attempted to shake the certainty 
of voters, taking aim directly at the weak point of the untested candidate Macron. 
 
This attempt at disrupting the electoral process had particularly high stakes, given 
that Macron was running against what some opponents argued was a xenophobic, 
far-right candidate in Marine Le Pen. Thus, had the leak unseated Macron and 
paved the way for Marine to win, it would have resulted in a pro-Frexit, and 
potentially xenophobic candidate to take power that would have potentially sent 
shockwaves across Europe and put the European integration projects very existence 
into question. At a time when the stakes were so high, this meant that anyone 
interested in what this leak would have contained was confronted with one route to 
information: social media. This presents somewhat of a conceptual paradox to 
established theories of the relationship between social media and established forms 
of journalism. The literature thus far (Gerbaudo, 2012; Bennett, 2012; Wolfsfeld, 
Segev, and Sheafer, 2013) has contended with the emergence of social media as a 
means through which complementary, uncontrolled sources of information disrupt 
established forms of journalism and shorten the news cycle with information 
spreading across the globe at an unprecedented rate where those actually at the 
centre of unfolding stories can not only post written accounts of what is going on but 
also can post images, video and even live stream unfolding news stories.  
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Social media platforms are applications built on the Internet which have extended 
ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 and they permit the sharing of 
content generated by users with one another (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). Facebook 
and Twitter are two examples of popular social media platforms (Stockdale et al., 
2012). Social media platforms were originally intended for people to use them in a 
personal capacity. Overtime it became apparent that these platforms were 
generating vast amounts of data that could be utilised for marketing purposes as well 
as academic research. Another principal consequential use of social media was its 
potential to bypass governmental censorship and allow users to freely critique 
politicians and political parties. Once such platform which has thrived for its use in 
the political sphere is Twitter. Twitter reports as having 328 million monthly active 
users with 1 billion unique monthly visits to tweets with 82% of users which access 
the platform via mobile devices (About Twitter, n.d.). Twitter has the potential to 
affect those who do not use the platform, for instance, family, friends, or news 
reports might share information to their immediate social network. This makes it 
exceedingly essential to study the types of content shared at the time of Macron 
Leaks, as well as the Twitter users that rose to prominence and were found to be 
influential.  
 
Social media platforms, therefore, can provide spaces for discussions to take place 
without government censorship because of the ability to create user-generated 
content. It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been a burst of social media 
research conducted on examining social media in the domains of politics (Gerbaudo, 
2012; Bennett, 2012; Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer, 2013). However, the politics of 
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internet leaks and hacks remains very much an under studied field in the emerging 
cyber politics of the contemporary era. This is remarkable given the frequency with 
which, over the past decade, important and sensitive political information has been 
leaked over the internet. There has been some work on the main player in the leaks 
game over the past decade, however this is still an understudied area. Some early 
work saw the rise of WikiLeaks in tandem with the broader advances in Information 
Technology and social media as a radical game changer, for instance, Sifry (2011) 
wrote that: 
 
‘We have clearly entered a new chapter in human history, where information 
technology has advanced so far as to render law, regulation, and social 
contentions powerless to keep up with its ability to change the course of 
human events’ (p.9) 
  
However, while leaks and their spread through social media clearly are important, 
they are not, a panacea when it comes to increasing government transparency. 
Roberts (2011) rightly argues that much of the hype around the 2010 WikiLeaks 
which hailed it as the beginning of an age of ‘radical transparency’ and the end of the 
ability of government to maintain a monopoly on classified information where over 
estimations of the role that such disruptive forces can play. Indeed, in relation to the 
Macron leaks scandal, it is precisely the power to disrupt, rather than any significant 
attempt at transparency or government accountability which becomes increasingly 
important as the leak was done in such a way that there was no time nor reporting 
capacity [1] to radically increase transparency. The significance of repeated 
breaches of sensitive information in the run up to major elections has led some 
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observers to question if this is to become the new normal, with Borger (2017) 
declaring that these repeated breaches signalled that ‘the onslaught has arrived’. 
This is highly significant given the opening up of influence in major electoral 
campaigns to potentially dark and destabilising forces. Work has been conducted on 
the political polarization of the far-right on Twitter (Conover et al, 2011) but this does 
not touch on how the far right use Twitter to influence the unfolding news agenda 
around politically influential leaks. 
 
Early work around networked democracy in relation to social media noted that social 
media platforms have inherent democratic capacities (Loader and Mercea, 2011) 
and there was much technological optimism surrounding the use of social media. 
However, it was noted that divisions between mainstream and citizen-generated 
content had become blurred. The case of the leaks relating to Emmanuel Macron 
highlight a different aspect of these social media platforms a means of disrupting the 
political sphere for contemptable reasons. The disruption capabilities provided, which 
were initially applauded, for instance as being instrumental in helping over throw 
totalitarian regimes also have a darker side, as they can be utilised to negatively 
affect and disrupt a democratic process. Clearly, as highlighted by data from Google 
Trends we could see that there was a rush among the general public within France 
and around the world to access information relating to the leaks. As long as those 
wishing to disrupt democratic processes have a venue for the dissemination of 
information on platform such as Twitter citizens out of inquisitiveness and due to the 
increased media attention may venture onto search engines and social media to 
access information pertaining to leaks.  
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Social media platforms have allowed millions of people from across the world to 
connect with one another and the extent to which social media platforms can support 
collective action has long been debated by scholars (Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer, 
2013). However, although the extent to which these platforms can support collective 
action is debated it is apparent that social media platforms can provide political 
movements with powerful, fast, and low-cost tools in order to recruit, fund-raise, and 
distribute images, collective discussions and mobilise users in order to take action 
(Bennett, 2006; Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer, 2013). 
 
Papacharissi (2016) writing on the construct of affective publics has noted that in the 
context of political movements that social media platforms can amplify visibility and 
voice and as a result they can amplify the expectations that citizens hold of these 
platforms. Moreover, Papacharissi (2016)  argues that due to the speed and rapid 
spread of information it may lead us to have high expectations because we may 
believe that if a story has emerged on social media and spread quickly that “it should 
be followed by immediate political, legislative, systemic change” (p.15). When these 
events do not occur social media may be blamed for having no political impact, 
however, it is argued that it is our expectations that will mislead us and that our own 
expectations may let us down. In the context of this present study it can be argued 
that news of the leaks relating to Emmanuel Macron may have raised the 
expectations of users that these leaks would have a devastating effect on the 
outcome of the election.  
 
It is also important to discuss the concept of hashtags. Hashtags present a layer of 
social media action which goes beyond tweeting, which in itself is an ‘emergent site 
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of discourse’ (Kress 2012:36). Hashtags add to this allowing actors to render their 
actions even more relevant through a link to a broader issue or campaign. To do this, 
hashtags are readily searchable phrase or keywords that follow a ‘#’ symbol. Thus, 
hashtags are important units around which broader discussions can be structured by 
quoting the hashtag. As such, hashtags instances of the use of ‘language about 
language, performing an affiliate (or reflective) function’ (Zappavigna 2012, location 
1620). Hashtags then bridge the processes of ‘speech production and the situation 
of speech reception’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2012:89). This is because they link an 
individual’s tweet to a broader campaign or ‘trend’ in addition to contextualising in a 
far broader debate or political movement what the individual is saying and thus 
rendering it a particular, albeit varying, relevance to readers. Thus, situating the 
analysis of tweets within a hashtag ‘allows transcending static spotlights and 
focusing on the diachronic reconstruction and explanation of discursive change’ 
(Reisigl and Wodak 2012, 120). 
 
Twitter, the focus of this article, has become an important platform for the 
dissemination of news, and certain incidents have the potential to unfold on Twitter 
before traditional news reports (Kwak, Lee, Park, Moon, 2010; Bruns, Highfield, Lind, 
2012), and research on Twitter has examined whether social media can bring about 
collective action (Segerberg and Bennett, 2011). However, manipulating Twitter to 
answer important political science questions like those presented for election black-
out periods by #MacronLeaks is not totally straight forward and requires significant 
methodological reflection. 
 
3. Methodological Approaches to understanding #MacronLeaks 
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This paper uses a digital mixed methods approach to understand different 
dimensions of how #MacronLeaks emerged and unfolded on Twitter. It is worth 
noting that there are several issues with the use of social media data to answer 
important political questions. In particular twitter does not allow free and open access 
to its complete data whether in real time or historical data. Rather, this requires 
purchasing from a licensed third-party data provider. A cost-free alternative is to use 
software to capture data in real time from the Twitter Search API, which was the 
approach employed in this paper. Here, NodeXL was utilised to retrieve n=15,346 
tweets with a total of n=7,313 unique users from 06 May, 2017 A network of users 
was retrieved whose tweets would contain “MacronLeaks”, or who were replied to 
and/or were mentioned in the tweets that were retrieved.  
 
It should be noted that there are limitations to using this cost free alternative to third 
party “Firehose” data providers. A problem of using Twitter Search API as a data 
source is that it can never guarantee that it will produce 100% of available data set 
(McCormick et al 2017). This is because the search API is a ‘black box’ whose 
working is not known to the public. However, it is generally considered a reliable 
method to retrieve data even though researchers can never fully know the 
completeness of their data set (McCormick et al 2017). As such, the sample 
presented for analysis here is assumed to be a valid and robust means by which to 
use Twitter to investigate the problem of election meddling during election blackout 
periods, with the given caveats that the exact and specific penetration of the full data 
set is not known and thus cannot be presented. Once the data was collected it then 
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required further manipulation to fulfil the research aims of this study. This was 
conducted utilising two different digital methods. 
 
3.1 Digital Social Network Analysis as a Method for Identifying Influential Users   
 
The first methodology employed to analyse the collected data set was social network 
analysis (SNA). The fundamental goal of SNA is to examine what structures 
relationships between individuals (Ahmed & Bath, 2015; Gardy et al., 2011; Scott, 
2017), here with how ideas spread and importantly what actors emerge as important 
in the spreading of messages across twitter. This gives important insights into not 
only which individuals emerge as important, but connections which they are 
embedded in (De Nooy, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2018). Thus, a fundamental feature of 
SNA is that it examines the structural relationships between socially connected 
actors (Davies, 2009). Applying SNA to Twitter data offers many insights into social 
media behaviour including establishing patterns of situational awareness, alongside 
insights into the salience of particular messages (Ahmed and Lugovic , 2019) with 
this in mind it is possible to examine conversations on Twitter not just in terms of 
their content, but also in their particular patterns of information flow (Himelboim et al 
2017). Some scholars have viewed social media as the “new public square” and 
here social network analysis enables us to map the various constituents of this 
space and their relations to each other (Smith et al 2014). This is important because 
in this “new public square” the election blackout meant that many of the established 
actors one would expect to find as important in the debate were silenced by electoral 
laws and were thus absent.  
 
 15 
Social network analysis was utilised at the primary method in identifying Twitter 
users who were influential during this time period using several quantitative metrics. 
In-degree tells us how many in-bound mentions a Twitter user received, and is one 
measure of influence. Out-degree tells us the frequency of out-bound mentions of 
Twitter accounts that used the keyword WikiLeaks. Betweenness centrality is a 
measure which is formed on accounts with strong communication paths and 
therefore regulate the flow of information. All of these come together to give us 
insights into how information relations are structure in the “new public square” (Smith 
et al 2004) an importantly who became important and how in the context of the 
removal of established actors from this context. 
 
3.3 Methods for Qualitative Content Analysis to Understand the Content of 
Discourses Spread During #MacronLeaks 
 
To conduct a detailed discourse analysis of the tweets and what messages they 
spread, a randomised 10% sample of the Twitter data set was taken using Microsoft 
Excel. This was done because it was not viable to code the entire data set. To this 
effect, a discourse analysis of the tweets was conducted. Discourse analysis is an 
inter-disciplinary methodology (Brown et al 1983) that seeks to understand how 
language enacts social and cultural perspectives and identities (Gee 2004). Within 
this, critical discourse analysis (CDA) seeks to bring power relations into the analysis 
to examine how power relations are established and re-produced through the use of 
language (Fairclough 2010). Discourse analysis, however, presents simply an 
approach to understanding text, and thus requires operationalization to be completed 
in a robust and reproducible fashion. This operationalization was conducted using a 
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6-step coding methodology suggested by Braun (2006) and Muir-Cochrance (2006). 
The themes emerged through the six-phase method which involved: familiarisation 
with data, generating initial codes, searching for themes among codes, reviewing 
themes, designing and naming themes and then producing the final report (Braun 
2006; Fereday and Muir-Cochrance 2006). Thus, several passes through the data 
were required to established initial coding categories, and then to follow this up with 
further refinement and adjustment to the coding categories. Once this was 
completed, the entire 10% of tweets were coded. This process was conducted using 
the qualiatative analysis software NVivo. 
 
4. Results and Reflections on #MacronLeaks: Empowering the 
Fringes in Both Network Structures and Discourse 
 
In line with the mixed methodology applied to the data collected for this study the 
results provide several important insights into the process through which 
#MacronLeaks created both forms of social networks and themes of discourse that 
necessitate both France and other European democracies to question their 
vulnerabilities to interferences created by their election blackout periods. The 
ongoing instability of European politics and political part structures and the rise of 
populism make this all the more relevant. 
 
It is important to understand the French political context in which #MacronLeaks 
occurred to understand the both the empirical content of the discourse created and 
also the high stakes for France, and Europe more broadly, presented by the 
specture of a far-right, Eurosceptic candidate being elected in the heart of Europe. 
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The election was unusual in recent European history with Macron, a candidate 
without the backing of a major party, placed in a run off with the leader of the far-right 
party the Nation Front, Marine Le Pen. As such, this was not business as usual, and 
the electoral context was highly uncertain given that candidates from the ‘safe’, 
established parities of French politics on both the left and right eliminated from the 
race, leaving the young, unproven, inexperienced Macron alone defending the centre 
ground in the wake of the political upsets of Brexit (the term given to the 2016 United 
Kingdom referendum to leave the European Union) and the 2016 U.S presidential 
election which saw Donald Trump elected president. While Macron was the odds on 
favourite it was also widely thought that this was a new political context where 
anything could happen. The leak was distributed via Pastebin (Almasy 2017) and 
further spread on the American forum ‘4Chan’ and relayed around the world by 
Wikileaks (Pierron 2017). The leak contained 14.5 GB of personal correspondence 
(Almasy 2017) with the En Marche! movement accusing Russia and Russian 
agencies of being behind the leak (Pierron 2017).  
 
Thus while the rules around media and candidate coverage in the French elections 
contain provisions for exceptions to the normal communications rules for certain 
events, for example natural disasters or physical attacks on France (Vie Publique 
2017). However, exceptions for foreign electronic election interference do not exist 
and #MacronLeaks poses the question as to whether France, and indeed other 
European democracies, would be wise to add such an exception to their electoral 
blackout laws to mitigate for future attempts at the influencing of election results. 
However, never before have circumstances conspired in this way, with an 
established media blackout, to make social media the dominant, if not the only, route 
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for the spread of information and the primary sources of news and information for 
voters in a major European democracy. It is important to state that this article does 
not endeavour to reveal the identity of those who obtained and leaked the 
information, their motives nor does it pertain to answer how the leak influenced 
voters. However, it does seek to provide scholars and policymakers with an 
understanding of what a social media response to such a leak during the crucial 
closing stages of an election look like – what the content of the key messages and 
indeed who are the key influencers in such a social media episode. This is important 
not just for furthering the understanding of social media, its study and situating its 
place in a rapidly changing and dynamic world, but also understanding which actors 
are key in such potentially influential political moments. By ascertaining this 
information, this article opens up significant questions about the accountability and 
trustworthiness of these influencers under such anarchical social media conditions. 
 
4.1 Substaintiating the Importance of the Web as Information Source during 
#MacronLeaks: The sharp increase in web activity: 
 
#MacronLeaks was timed to coincide with the start of the blackout period – being 
released only hours before both candidates and media outlets were barred from 
further election coverage (Almasy 2017). This meant that the only place for citizens 
to get information was online. This was reflected with heightened interest in citizens 
seeking information related to the leaks during this time, and the figure below was 
created by utilising data from Google Trends and it shows how there was a 
substantial increase in Google Web Search queries for leaks concerning Emmual 
Macron. Google ranks search popularity from 0 to 100, where a value of 100 is the 
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peak popularity for a term, and 50 half as popular. The largest peak in Web search 
queries occurred on the day the leaks were announced.   
 
Moreover, when examining the geographical distribution of tweets it was found that 
the highest rate of interest derived from France with a Google Trends score of 100 
(the highest). Google also identifies related Web search queries which were the 
following Emmanuel Macron (100), Twitter (10), WikilLeaks (10), 4chan (5), and 
France (5). It is interesting to note the heightened interest in Web search queries 
from France as the mainstream media were not reporting the content of the leaks 
and this finding indicates that citizens would take to the World Wide Web in order to 
locate information on the leaks. The second most related query consisted of Twitter 
indicating that users were searching for information on the platform. This is important 
because it demonstrates the primacy of Twitter in the case even over and above 
other social media platforms. This primacy is a key reason why this study chooses 
Twitter as its main focus. Thus in the vacuum of information from established news 
sources, the open, google indexed and searchable nature of Twitter offered those 
who sought information on a leak and easier way to access information compared 
with other, less easily accessible, alternatives such as Facebook.  
 
Figure 1 – Google Web Search Queries for ‘Macron Leaks’  
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4.2 Using Social Network Metrics to Understand who Spread Messages and 
How: Results Related to Influential Twitter users 
  
The first set of results presented by this paper are a set of Twitter metrics that 
demonstrate the most influential actors in spreading messages about 
#MacronLeaks. This is important in understanding the importance of #MacronLeaks 
beyond both the effect that the leak had on the election outcome and also moving 
beyond simply the importance of what was contained in the leak itself. This is 
because in examining #MacronLeaks as demonstrating the vulnerabiulity presented 
by blackout periods to election meddling it is important to think not just about the 
content of the leaks but also who is put in important discursive positions by the fact 
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that established media is shut out of the picture by the blackout. In examining the 
Twitter response to the #MacronLeaks hashtag, using data recorded from 
TrendsMap by 9.30am GMT there were at least 207,600 tweets using the hashtag 
#Macronleaks, and many of these tweets were retweets (177,800 – 86%), while 
4,300 (2%) were replies which highlights how information propagation occurred very 
rapidly during this time. Moreover, it was found that there were around 25,500 
individual unique tweets that were sent in a very short amount of time. Table 1, 
below, ranks Twitter users across metrics of In-Degree, Out-Degree, and 
Betweenness Centrality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 - Top ten 5 influential users  
No User In-
Degree 
Out-Degree Betweenness 
Centrality 
1 WikiLeaks 497 1 13161586.433 
2 Jackposobiec 488 2 10197959 
3 David_vanh 211 8 3155062.424 
4 Malcolmnance 219 1 2870010.223 
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5 Emmanuelmacron 143 0 2617811.392 
 
The most influential account ranked by betweenness centrality was that of WikiLeaks 
who had become a main player in the dissemination of the materials related to the 
leaks. The Twitter account was also receiving a number of inbound connections (In=-
Degree) from Twitter users because users would refer to WikiLeaks as the source of 
the account and/or critique the account. This positions WikiLeaks as being a key 
player in the discussions of the leaks. The second most influential Twitter account 
was that of ‘Jackposobiec’, Donald Trump supporter and author of ‘Citizens for 
Trump: The Inside Story of the People’s Movement to Take Back America’ made 
headlines at the time because the user was sharing links to their followers (currently 
over 207 thousand) leading people to WebPages with links to Macron Leaks. The 
third most influential Twitter user was a Dutch activist who was critical of Macron 
during the height of the leaks. The fourth most influential Twitter account related to a 
former US intelligence operative and terrorist expert who is the author of The Plot to 
Hack America which is a Spy thriller and was the user was tweeting about the 
potential link between Macron Leaks and Russian Military Intelligence. The firth most 
influential Twitter account was that of Emmanuel Macron who did not specifically 
tweet about the leaks himself but who was caught up in the controversy and was 
subsequently tagged by other users indicating that although not tweeting directly that 
Emanuel Macron was an important in the discussions that were taking place.  
 
These are important observations for the key message of this paper that 
#MacronLeaks represents an important warning shot about the vulnerabilities to 
European democracies presented by election meddling during blackout periods. This 
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is because examining the most influential actors shows that those who were the 
most influential were the most likely to pose a threat not only to the Macron 
campaign, but to the established rules of the election blackout. Thus wikileaks and 
right wing actors in America were not covered by the election blackout, and 
importantly neither are covered by rules around media conduct. Thus this gives the 
possibility of a highly skewed take on #MacronLeaks. This shows through social 
media analysis we can see that it is not just the fact that a leak occurs, or indeed the 
content of the leaks which are the only aspects of such a leak that are important for 
democracy but rather also who is put in primary positions to spread narratives in the 
conditions of election blackouts.  
 
Now that it has been understood who was important in spreading the messages 
during #MacronLeaks it is also important to understand which messages were the 
most spread. Table 2 below provides an overview of some of the most shared URLs 
on Twitter during the height of the leaks.  
 
Table 2 – Top 5 most shared URLs 
 
Rank Title of Page (URL) No. of 
Shares 
1 Hashtag Campaign: #MacronLeaks 
Alt-right attacks Macron in last ditch effort to sway French 
Election (https://medium.com/dfrlab/hashtag-campaign-
macronleaks-4a3fb870c4e8) 
 
108 
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2 Archeive.is page of to download Macron Leaks 
 
73 
3 WikiLeaks Confirms Leaked Macron Campaign Emails Are 
Authentic #MacronLeaks 
(http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2017/05/breaking-
WikiLeaks-confirms-leaked-macron-campaign-emails-
authentic-macronleaks/)  
 
57 
4 #MacronLeaks : WikiLeaks confirme l’authenticité des mails 
sur Macron, les médias français ont ordre de taire les 
révélations !!! La question de l’invalidation de l’élection 
présidentielle est posée 
(https://civilwarineurope.com/2017/05/06/france-alerte-
WikiLeaks-confirme-la-fuite-de-milliers-de-mails-authentiques-
sur-macron-les-medias-francais-ont-ordre-de-taire-les-
revelations ) 
 
26 
5 L’équipe de Macron dénonce un «piratage massif» de 
documents internes (http://plus.lesoir.be/92806/article/2017-05-
05/lequipe-de-macron-denonce-un-piratage-massif-de-
documents-internes) 
 
26 
 
The most shared Web link was that related to a Medium article (a blogging platform) 
which provided information on how the alt-right were attempting to alter the outcome 
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of the French election. It is interesting to note that no mainstream media outlet had 
covered the leaks because they were prevented from doing so. This is again 
important because this demonstrates that not only were marginal media outlets and 
actors important in spreading messages about #MacronLeaks, they were also pivotal 
in creating what messages were spread again in the absence of comment from 
trusted and established media outlets. This is again worrying because this opens up 
the possibility for a more complex and sophisticated election meddling campaign to 
exploit the press blackout to manipulate unregulated sources of information to 
spread campaign changing messages. 
 
The second most shared Web URL pointed to a page whereby it was possible to 
download the leaks which highlights how Twitter was an important back channel 
utilised to share links allowing users to access the leaks. This is again important 
because it made it possible for the public to have direct access to the leaked 
documents themselves. While in this case the leaked documents were authentic, 
and did not contain any problematic information for Macron, this direct sharing of 
information demonstrates the vulnerability of blackout periods to the possibility of 
false information being spread without the ability of mainstream media outlets nor 
political campaigns themselves to be able to comment on them. The third most 
frequently shared URL was a news article indicating that the Macron leaks were 
authentic. The fourth most shared URL was a further article which indicated that the 
Macron Leaks were confirmed as being authentic and the article raised the question 
of whether the presidential election had become invalidated. The firth most shared 
article was relaying the news that the Macron election team denounced the leaks as 
that of mass piracy.  
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4.3 Understanding Which Themes were Important in the discussion of 
#MacronLeaks: Results of Qualitative Discourse Analysis of the tweets 
 
Moving beyond just examining the most shared URLs for #Macronleaks it is also 
important to understand the broader spread of discourse which accompanied the 
incident. This is important because in what has been dubbed the “post-truth” era 
where scholars have argued that a US president could be “memed” into existence 
(Nussbaum 2016), it is important to understand the broader discursive context in 
which such a leak occurs and which discussions accompany it. In the absence of the 
ability of mainstream media or the political candidates themselves to create content 
which can be shared be social media users it is key to consider which narratives 
emerged to fill this void. This section provides results from an in-depth analysis of 
tweets which was performed on the data. The table below provides a summary of 
results from the in-depth qualitative analysis of tweets.  
 
Table 3: Summary of coding categories and coding totals 
Theme: Description: Percentage 
Conspiracy 
theory/anti-
systemic 
Presented the leak as occurring in the context 
of conspiracies or expressed anti-systemic 
sentiments 
18 
Anti-Macron Expressed anti-Macron sentiments 17 
Neutral Neutral retweets of links 14 
Press Blackout Referenced the French legal press blackout 12 
Russia Referenced Russian involvement 10 
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WikiLeaks Referenced WikiLeaks  8 
Humour Described the leak in humorous terms 7 
Analysis Linked to expert analysis 5 
Anti-Marine Le Pen 
bias 
Referenced anti Marine Le Pen bias of 
mainstream media/politics 
4 
Pro-Macron Expressed pro-Macron sentiments 3 
USA References USA involvement or politics 2 
 
The data was sorted into 11 categories, however, only 5 of these are deemed as 
important for furthering our understanding how the #MacronLeaks scandal was 
discussed on Twitteri. These 5 categories accounted for 58% of the total Twitter 
traffic, and will be analysed separately here. These five categories are described 
below.  
 
Theme 1 – Conspiracy Theories  
 
In the absence of the possibility of neither the French media nor the candidates 
themselves to comment on #MacronLeaks the most common form of discourse 
which accompanied the leaks were discussions of conspiracy theories surrounding 
Macron and his election campaign. Thus again this demonstrates the importance of 
#MacronLeaks in demonstrating the vulnerabilities presented by election blackout 
periods in creating a discursive vacuum into which conspiracy theory tweets can 
become important.  The category contained the highest frequency of tweets 
referenced conspiracy theories and included anti-systemic narratives, with 16% of 
the total. This included such things as referencing Macron’s association with the 
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Rothschild’s as a reason why he was so widely defended during the leak, a Twitter 
user noted:  
 
 ‘Hmmm I wonder why someone who's a Rothschild is defending one of their 
bankers 😂’.  
 
This also included the depiction of the general political landscape as unfairly 
weighted in favour of Macron, including arguing that the French media network 
Agence France-Presse (AFP) was continuing their campaign for Macron after the 
official midnight press blackout on election campaigning. This occurs in this context 
of a lack of media sources such as Agence France-Presse beng able to cover the 
leak nor the broader political context of election meddling. Thus voters taking to 
twitter to get information under the hashtag of #MacronLeaks would have been 
confronted with these narratives. 
 
Theme 2– Anti-Macron Discussions  
 
Complimenting the prominence of conspiracy theories in the coverage of 
#MacronLeaks was the second most prominent theme which emerges in the 
discourse which were anti-Macron discourses. These include individuals tweeting 
about Macron being dishonest and corrupt. Maligning that the French would never 
the less vote for him as a user noted: 
 
“Macron could well be the biggest crook in the country, but the French would still 
vote for him”.  
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The tweets also sought to tie Macron negatively to recent terror attacks in France, 
citing that the emails contained communication between himself and as one Twitter 
user noted the “terror funding Saudis”. This again demonstrates that it is not simply 
the origin event of election meddling that demonstrates the vulnerability of 
democracies during media blackout periods, but also the broader social media 
messages which are created by users and shared in a context where established 
political candidates and media outlets are banned from making comments. Thus 
more than one third (35%) of the social media response is constituted by conspiracy 
theory and anti-Macron sentiment demonstrating how skewed the discourses 
created in the wake of #MacronLeaks were. Thus by being “blacked out” the 
absence of media or political comment on the leaks empowers fringe narratives to 
become numerically the most important in shaping the political discourse during this 
event. 
 
These conspiracy theory narratives were also supplemented with user created visual 
‘memes’ that linked Macron and his stance to being dangerous for France in it’s 
ability to facilitate terror attacks. Figure 2 below shows a shared visual meme that 
connects Macron’s liberal political stance with facilitating terror in France. Here, it 
quotes Macron as saying ‘there is not French culture’ and situates him with a thumbs 
up with the devastation of the Bataclan concert hall attack behind him. This is a 
decontextualized quote from a speech he made where the full quote is “there is no 
French culture. There is a culture on France. It is diverse’ (Jégo 2017). Obviously 
this changes the context of what he is saying significantly. This ties in with tactics 
used on social media by the American Alt-right where they create highly stylised 
 30 
graphical memes that depicted politicians as being globalist, pro-immigration and 
anti-‘native’ cultures. This graphic was also shared in tandem with another in figure 
3. 
 
Figure 2: Twitter meme about Macron 
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Figure 3: Twitter meme showing Marine le Pen and her niece as defenders of France 
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Here, this meme shows the leader of the far right national front and her niece as 
heroic knights with swords standing ready to defend the colours of the French flag. 
Again these two memes show the way that Twitter users are attempting to use a 
scandal to shift political opinion to the fringes. This is especially important given the 
two contextual points in which the leaks operate – where there is actually no tangible 
evidence for any wrong doings to discredit Macron, but where the media blackout 
pushes the power to cover the scandal into the hands of social media users 
promoting fringe political agendas.  
 
Others pointed out, without referencing any particular offense, that the leaks would 
ruin Macrons presidency even if he was elected. Here, these tweets attempt to 
render the Macron leaks scandal as something that cements negative opinions of 
Macron, founded or not, and create a climate where the favourite to win the French 
presidential election should be seen in a negative light.  
 
This, combined with the above theme of anti-systemic and conspiracy theory related 
narratives accounts for 31% of the tweets coded in this sample. While much 
attention has been made to hackers, and indeed leaks, affecting politics with the 
content of the documents released, these discussions emphasise the importance of 
also looking at how the social media traffic related to such incidents can have 
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political impact. This is because they are extremely numerous, and indeed extremely 
slanted against mainstream and centrist politicians in the case of Macron leaks. In 
terms of a contrast, pro-macron tweets accounted for a low 2% within the sample. 
Thus, especially under conditions of a campaign blackout where mainstream media 
that is required to uphold rigorous standards is completely silenced, the 
overwhelming bias related to discussions on Twitter are important. 
 
 
 
 
 
Theme 3– Midnight Campaign Blackout 
 
The third theme which is the reference to the midnight campaign blackout imposed 
during all French presidential elections. This is important because the leak was timed 
specifically to co-inside with this deadline of the legal end of reporting so that the 
raining uncertainty created by the media being unable to report on the leak would 
create an atmosphere of uncertainty about what the leak contained and whether it 
was important or not. Arguably, this could have been because the stolen files 
themselves did not actually contain anything explosive, thus there would be no utility 
in leaking them with enough time to let the media report on them. It is this blackout, 
and period of uncertainty, that makes the emergence of the top two themes of the 
tweets, being anti-Macron and anti-system/conspiracy theories all the more 
important because Twitter was one of the few places that voters could go for news 
on the leaks before they actually casted their votes. 
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The final two themes which are important for analysis reference Russia (9%) and 
WikiLeaks (7%) outlined next. Both of these themes are interesting because of the 
multitude of messages contained within them. 
 
Theme 4 – Russia  
Russia in particular polarises the Twitter traffic, with many referencing Russia as 
intervening to create the leaks and thus the uncertainty because they have 
sympathies for far-right politicians such as Marie Le Pen who had a specifically more 
pro-Russian image then the other candidates in the French elections. Others simply 
re-tweeted or reported the detection of Cyrillic in the files, arguing that this was 
enough to tie the leaks directly to Russia.  
 
Theme 5 – WikiLeaks  
WikiLeaks featured in a far more descriptive way, with the organisation referenced 
as important in the dissemination of the leaked data, and as working to interpret 
exactly what the emails contained with no discussion of the legitimacy of it as a 
source of information at such an important time in a major democratic election. Thus, 
a reading of this could be that the Twitter traffic presents WikiLeaks as a reliable 
source of information, another worrying trend given that the organisation is not held 
up to any formal regulations or rigour.  
 
5. A Warning for Election Blackout Periods: Conclusions on #MacronLeaks 
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This paper has demonstrated that election silence periods have metamorphosed into 
vulnerabilities to European democracy in the context of increased attempts at election 
meddling. Thus while social media has long been established to have potential for 
collective action (Author removed, 2017; Papacharissi, 2016) its behaviour during 
election meddling in silence periods has not been studied. Doing this has enabled this 
paper to make a contribution to not only this literature but in understanding the 
importance of thinking about the need to reform the way in which democratic 
processes are conducted in the digital age. Thus neither the effect of the leaks on the 
polls nor the content of the leak are the only things that are important but rather the 
ability of social media to empower fringe voices in spreading and covering the leaks is 
a worrying trend. While in the case of #MacronLeaks the leak did not cost Macron the 
election, analysing it’s anatomy as a Twitter episode is an important warning to 
Europe in that a more sophisticated and well planned attempt at election meddling 
could capitalise on the vulnerabilities created by election silence periods to seek to 
sway other elections. Indeed, in this particular case the laws in France which regulate 
election coverage have exemptions for certain disruptive events, including natural 
disasters or physical attacks on France (Vie Publique 2017), it may now be time to re-
evaluate these laws and add election meddling and cyber-attacks as an exemption to 
the current press laws.  
 
When reflecting on the users that were tweeting during #MacronLeaks it appears that 
those accounts who were found to be most influential had considerable reach on 
Twitter. Indeed, our results indicate that Twitter was a central platform for the public to 
access information related to the leaks. Importantly, our results have highlighted how, 
at the time of the leaks which were a major political scandal, the majority of the 
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content on Twitter contained anti-Macron narratives. A significant difference between 
mainstream media and Twitter is its unregulated nature. This allows potentially 
unfounded claims to emerge and rise to prominence dubbed as ‘fake news’ which has 
received considerable interest in recent years. The implications for this is important 
because political opponents can utilise social media platforms such as Twitter to 
generate and propagate false information rapidly, and potentially anonymously. 
WikiLeaks appeared to be an influential Twitter account during the leaks and the 
narratives indicated that the account appeared to be a reputable source of 
information. This is a potential cause for alarm because the account and organisation 
is not designed to follow formal regulations or the rigour which is applied to 
mainstream organisations. Moreover, the fact that traditional media may not report 
and/or comment on material released online may lead to greater interest among the 
general public. Currently, the politics of Internet leaks and hacks remains an under 
studied field, however, it is clear that modern communication devices such as Twitter 
have had a profound effect on how politics is conducted. In regards to limitations of 
our study it was limited because it retrieved data via the Search API which is a 
sample of discussion taking place and certain tweets may have been excluded. 
Further research could seek examine the extent to which Twitter may have influenced 
the voting behaviour of users that were observing and viewing tweets at the time, for 
instance, via interviews and surveys. The results of this study may be of interest to 
researchers interested in examining how information is leaked on social media.   
 
Overall, our article has shed new light on the users that were engaging with the 
#Macronleaks hashtag and raises significant questions for the role of social media 
in such a delicate election context. Moreover, it highlights the potential of social 
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media platforms and Web 2.0 technologies to give a platform for those wishing to 
disrupt and undermine democratic processes. The prominence of WikiLeaks as a 
prominent influencer of the narrative of Macron leaks raises significant questions 
because it falls outside of any national or professional regulations about journalistic 
integrity. In this case, Macron was fortunate that WikiLeaks acted ethnically in this 
case and did not disseminate ‘fake news’ about the content of the leaks which 
could have seriously damaged his chances of election.  
 
Thus, these findings should be of interest to government organisations, politicians, 
and academies within the field of social media and political participation in an era 
where ‘fake news’ and memes spread on social media are becoming increasingly 
important, yet unregulated and under-considered features of the political landscape. 
Here, governments and policy makers are lagging behind emergent trends and 
these findings may require France in particular to re-consider it’s ban on media 
coverage of presidential campaigns under specifics circumstances as other 
interventions of this type are unlikely to be limited to this election campaign and by 
forbidding mainstream media to report on the leak, France inadvertently favoured 
fringe political voices and pushed it’s citizens to unregulated media outlets. Thus it 
would be wise for European, and indeed global, democracies to heed the “warning 
shot” fired during #MacronLeaks to critically assess press coverage rules around 
presidential campaigns and to think carefully about whether the contemporary 
context of foreign election meddling and cyber-attacks makes election blackouts an 
“Achilles heel” of democratic processes. 
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i Two categories did not contain any narratives important to understanding the political 
discourses about Macronleaks. One was neutral and retweets which contains no important 
discursive statements, the other was ‘humour’ which made jokes and parodies about macron 
leaks. A further 4 categories were not frequent enough to warrant further discussion as they 
each represented under 5% of the total discussion. 
